HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AN ARTICLE BY ATUL KUMAR PUBLISHED IN WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

AN ARTICLE BY ATUL KUMAR PUBLISHED IN WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

1.         Indian foreign policy in real terms came into being with the advent of independence in 1947. Till then, the nation, as a satellite of the British Empire, had no diplomatic identity and eschewed those postulates of foreign policy as were dictated by the erstwhile rules. India’s role in the First World War and the subsequent course of its rudimentary diplomatic overtures were constrained by the prevailing British influence. A fair idea of the ambiance that prevailed at the time of independence can be had from an excerpt of an address by Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru [1]as the Vice Chairman of the Viceroy’s Executive Council (A precursor to self-governance) of 07 Sep 1946, who said

     “We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned to against one another which have led to two world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale  We seek no dominion over others and we claim no privileged position over other people.”

2.         However, much one may appreciate the idealistic intent of such a policy of peaceful coexistence bereft of narrow alignments, and however desirable be such a policy of peaceful laissez-faire, this basic postulate had an inherent flaw in it.  Humanity is by nature gregarious and given to alignments of convenience for subjective interests.  To maintain and nurture an attitude of oriental detachment amidst this ambiance was, and is, a tall order.  Political rhetoric aside, a pragmatic approach would have been to resort to a cautious alignment with one of the power blocs primarily for regional security and stability.  Needless to say, such a tie-up at that point in history would have required a deep understanding of the power equations prevalent.  In hindsight, it is evident that India did realize the flaw in its initial foreign policy structure after the 1962 Chinese debacle when it had to appeal to the USA for assistance. 

3.         The course of foreign policy in India and the major events that shaped it makes an interesting study.  At this point, it is pertinent to analyse the various options open to India in terms of the erstwhile power blocs besides its then preferred option of non-alignment for a fuller understanding of the prevalent equation.

(a)       The USA.      Firmly entrenched in its belief in democratic ideals, the USA sought advocates of its policies in all corners of the globe.  Initially, the US designed to win over India by grant of liberal developmental assistance such as PL 480 etc with the proviso that we join its cold war military alliance of the SEATO.  The NATO, CENTO and SEATO were the projection of the US anti-Communist measures in a world getting increasingly divided along opposing political ideologies.

(b)     The USSR.           Communist USSR sought to spread its ideological tentacles like USA, by creating similar strategic pact organisations that dispensed economic largesse and security cover in return for a satellite status of host nations. The WARSAW pact and its allies primarily sought Europe as its target continent with Yugoslavia, Poland and Austria etc succumbing to USSR’s coercive diplomacy.  India having commenced its self-government as declared advocates of non-alignment and Panchsheel, at some point in history developed a strong sense of dependence, camaraderie and alliance with the erstwhile USSR.  The first step towards India’s disillusionment with the US and its search for an alternative patron was the membership of Pakistan of US sponsored alliance of SEATO.  The US recruitment of Pakistan into the SEATO was part of grand strategy for containment of USSR and consequently in the face of vehement Indian protest, the US provided liberal military assistance to region. With a strong China to the North and North East and a rapidly growing Pakistan to the West, India had to put its non-aligned posture on the hold for a while and approach the USSR for a counter-balance. The USSR, notwithstanding its initial apathy, took a considered decision to assist India, thereby commencing a lasting alliance of convenience, which cooled off only after the breakup of the USSR.  The pact between India and USSR though not ratified by any official endorsement of Communism or the Warsaw pact by India, yet existed as long as it did it an atmosphere of mutual approval of all major strategic decisions by the two nations.

(c)        China.      In terms of ideology though China was communist, yet it had global aspirations independent of USSR and its satellites. The only nation that had the wherewithal both strategically and ideologically to chart a foreign policy course independent of the USA or USSR was China under Mao Zedong. Soon after the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed on 01 October 1949, the Government of India extended official recognition to it on 30 December 1949.  India was the second non-communist country to recognize China; Burma being the first.  It was hoped that this would further strengthen the time-old immemorial friendship between India and China and be conducive to the stability of Asia and the peace of the world. 

4.         The Fifties: Halcyon Years of Ambivalence.          The preponderance of political leaders and philosophers in the ruling elite of India in the immediate post-independence era such as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr S Radhakrishnan and Mahatma Gandhi brought an element of thought and idealism into our polity. The early years of our freedom saw the formative state of all our policies on international understanding and diplomacy with “laissez-faire” as the bulwark. Nehru served as his own foreign minister and throughout his life remained the chief architect of India's foreign policy. During his premiership, Nehru tried hard to identify the country's foreign policy with anti-colonialism and anti-racism. He also tried to promote India's role as the peacemaker, which was seen as an extension of the policies of Mahatma Gandhi and as deeply rooted in the indigenous religious traditions of Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism. Like most foreign policies, India's was, in fact, based first of all on its government's perceptions of national interest and on security considerations. India's foreign policy, defined by Nehru as nonaligned, was based on “Five Principles” (Panchsheel): “mutual respect” for other nations' “territorial integrity and sovereignty”; nonaggression; noninterference in “internal affairs”; equality and mutual benefit; and “peaceful coexistence.” With the opening of the 1950's, India was attempting to play a subject role in international politics even though it did not possess all the attributes necessary for such a role.  India endeavored to overcome its power weakness by politically mobilizing other Asian and African nations and by assuming, for a time, the leadership of the non-aligned nations.  The United States considered this policy as not only an obstacle in the way of American containment of the Soviet Union but also an attempt to create an additional world force. It is in this context that the United States launched a policy of military containment and neutralisation of India through the military build up of Pakistan in 1954. These years of diplomatic vacillations and ambiguity were characterised by a general unwillingness to address foreign policy issues in perspective and with pragmatic foresight and resort rather to benevolent idealism in a big scenario.  The one noteworthy occasion when this utopian garb was laid temporarily aside for practical considerations was during the period of the accession of Kashmir. in our first major diplomatic endeavor we managed to only agree to a cease-fire on as-is where-is basis and got straddled with  a UNO military observer group for enforcement of this brokered peace when in all justification the very least we could have hoped for was a withdrawal of Pak forces to the delineated International Border.

5.         The Sixties:  Panchsheel, Non-Alignment and the Chinese Debacle.      The next era after the formative years of Indian foreign policy was the era of Panchsheel and non-alignment.  Border issues over the validity of the Mac Mohan line, incursions into Aksai Chin, and military action in Tibet by the Chinese, were all sort to be resolved by discussions without appropriate military preparedness to stalemate any attempts at coercive diplomacy by China. The coup de grace to India’s global role occurred in military debacle of 1962 which revealed that the country's role pretensions were inconsistent with its capabilities.  Nehru's attempt to build a recognised global role for India failed because of the wide spread recognition after 1962 that India was not master in its own house. It is history that 1962 saw the humiliation of an India whose diplomacy and statesmanship could neither prevent a war with China, nor its military machine sustain, ill-equipped and ill-prepared that it was. The Chinese invasion humiliated India and shook its position in the international sphere and gave it its first lesson that Utopian foreign policies are often ignored in the face of pragmatic geopolitical compulsions and a military backup to diplomacy is a pre-requisite. The upshot of the episode was that the Indian principled non-aligned posturing was laid at least temporarily on the backburner, while we appealed to the US for economic and military sustenance. The handling of the 1965 war with negotiations by the new Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri with Pakistan in Tashkent is all indicative of an era of the decisive diplomacy as opposed to the earlier vacillation. India required a firm regional base in South Asia since local hegemony is a pre-requisite for broader ambitions.  Hence India moved away from such diffuse goals as world peace to concrete interests such as defence and economic growth. There emerged an increased realism about diplomacy. Since India lacked the internal economic base to build arms capabilities, it resorted to borrowing these from the United States and the USSR. This bi-alignment with the United States and the USSR diminished India's role among the non-aligned countries.

6.         The Seventies: Rise of Diplomatic Maneuvers.         With the cold war at its peak, India was pushed into the centre stage of action in the early 1970's. It was in this period that India gave concrete proofs of its capability to become a regional super power in the 21st century. During the Bangladesh Crisis, India was staggered by the American warning that it should expect no assistance from the United States, in the event of Chinese intervention[2]. To counter the alliance between the US and China against India, in a masterly balance of power move, Indira Gandhi entered into a treaty of friendship with the USSR.  When war erupted, with the United States and China neutralised by the USSR, both diplomatically and militarily, India was able to inflict a severe military defeat on America's proxy Pakistan.  India created a new strategic environment and emerged as the pre-eminent power in the subcontinent.  India's nuclear explosion in 1974 was an indicator that it would endeavour to maintain her pre-eminence in the sub-continent and her status as an independent centre of power.

7.    The Eighties.        It was in the 1980’s that India began to come into it’s own in terms of foreign policy. The success of the 1971 war, a stronger military and a mature nation was partly the reason. Secondly, increasing domestic troubles led to the need of a greater engagement with the world as the emergence of media had led to the increased role of “international pressure”. India began to have greater role in the Asian forums, engaged several countries bilaterally and heavily increased their UN peacekeeping engagements. However, internal troubles and changing politics stopped us from truly achieving a global status in economic forums. The decade started on a more ominous note for India's strategic concerns.  The United States stepped up its presence in Indian Ocean by expanding facilities at Diego Garcia and instituted Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) culminating in the establishment of Central Command (CENTCOM). The Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan was used by Pakistan as a handy tool to re-arm itself on an unprecedented scale, triggering off a virtual arms race in the sub continent.  In the neighborhood Sri Lanka was becoming a growing security concern due to the involvement of outside powers like Israel, China and Pakistan.  India reasserted its dominance in the region by initiating the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and implementing it by peace keeping operations which obtained wide international approval. Indo-U.S. relations improved during the last half of the 1980s with greater trade, scientific cooperation, and cultural exchanges. With the resumption of civil rule in Pakistan in 1988, India's relations with that country also reached a new level of friendship, though the South Asian thaw proved to be brief.

8.         The Nineties: Post Cold War Context of Indian Foreign Policy.    The decade of the nineties opened with changes of lasting importance in the international political system. The break up of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Soviet block and the collapse of the socialist system violently shook up the affected states and the inter-state relations, necessitating every state to redefine its stand in international politics and reorient its foreign policy accordingly.  India’s foreign policies first significant change in direction, attendant with change in India’s economic policies took place under the stewardship of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who was the initiator of India’s ‘New Look’ foreign policies. Rao’s ‘New Look’ foreign policies arose from the prevailing international environment at the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its global countervailing power and the need for India to detach its foreign policies from domestic minority vote bank considerations and also to focus on neglected regions. Hence, the thrust for a strategic partnership with Israel in West Asia and the ‘Look East’ foreign policy was envisaged. So also was the quest for a substantive relationship with the United States.

9.         The late 90’s saw the major rise of United States unilateralism and the new American policies of pre-emption and military intervention in global affairs without restraint. At the same time, under Vajpayee’s government, Indian nuclear tests, vast increases in defense spending after the Kargil war and the success of the Indian economy saw India become internally strong and for the first time a genuine player on the world scene. The 50+ years of efforts, some successful and others not, began to take fruit. India’s ambitions as a global power suddenly became useful to other players due to the recent geopolitical happenings. Rise of terrorism, India’s location of influence, rise of economics as a major political force, need for the western powers to expand influence to Asia and fading away of the negativity associated with Soviet association during the cold war led to India becoming a favored partner for many in the world.

10.       21^st Century.            The latter half of the 1990s till 2004 witnessed a BJP Government in power. Its tenure coincided with the post-Cold War era, the major rise of United States unilateralism and the new American policies of pre-emption and military intervention in global affairs without restraint. The Vajpayee Government of the BJP continued with the overall general direction of foreign policies of the Narasimha Rao Government.  However greater intensity was accorded to the build-up of US-India strategic cooperation, normalising and enlarging cooperation with China, besides Vajpayee’s personal commitment to bring a military adventurist and terrorism proxy-war nation like Pakistan to the dialogue table.  Energy security, terrorism, new markets and globalization are just a few of the things that have huge direct benefits to an influential country. The major debates are the degree of our engagement with the US, our handling of the Islamic world, China and our lofty international goals vis-à-vis a poor and starving nation.

11.       The initial few years of the 21st Century in terms of international / political developments impacting on India’s foreign policies presented  the following broad picture:-

(a)       United States with its tactical obsession with Pakistan had placed the emerging USA-India strategic partnership on the back-burner. India was no longer a priority for USA.

(b)       Russia at long last had realized that it was no longer a “natural ally of the West”. The post-Cold War knee-jerk reaction of forging a strategic alliance with China had not brought the desired fruits.

(c)        China despite a phenomenal rise in trade with India and a flurry of visits by senior Chinese leaders to India had yet to give up its strategic nexus with Pakistan. China continued with the military build-up of Pakistan and establishing the infrastructure of a Chinese military presence in Pakistan.

(d)       The Indian sub-continent or so called South Asia presented a dismal security environment. Pakistan strategically buoyed by American political, economic and military aid continued with its illusions of strategic parity with India and had not displayed any indicators of political maturity or conflict resolution. Turmoil and conflict continued in Nepal and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh under the present political dispensation was anti-Indian and emerging as an alternative base for Pakistan’s proxy war against India.

12.       India’s history of masterly inactivity belies the hope of its willingness to act cogently and decisively at times of strategic need.  India appears to be caught in a time-warp in which its psychological tussle of de-linking from its past and stepping into a cathartic present appear too onerous a task for its rulers and statesman.  They would do well to take their lessons in heralding positive change from Mikhail Gorbachov who hastened the severance of the ties of his country with the communist past with profound wisdom and sensitively, to redeem a USSR living on tons of worthless paper money in a inflation-ridden economy and took it on a road to progress even at the expense of initial setbacks.

---

[1] Nehru Jawaharlal: Excerpt of address as quoted by Pant KC, Non-Provocative Defense, 1984  pp 273

[2] Kuldip Nayar, India After Nehru (Vikas: Delhi, 1977), p.187 and Zareer Masani, Indra Gandhi, A Biography.  (Oxford University Press: Delhi, 1975.), p.238